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power.10 It is of no importance how strong the public desire is, ful-
fillment of this doctrine can only be achieved by a constitutional
amendment.:" Opposed to the doctrine espoused by these cases 2
the constitutionality of assessing banks a percentage of their deposits
so as to create a common fund guaranteeing these deposits has found
affirmance in the highest tribunal in the land.' 3 In a similar vein to
force employers to make payments to a pool-fund and to disburse
these funds in compensation for injuries for which the employers are
not at fault has been deemed a valid exercise of the police power.14
Instances of pool-fund contributions are many.' 5 The exigency for
such legislation must exist in a great public need.16 The right to do
so lies in the power of the state to regulate their own domains in
legislating for the public safety, morals and welfare. 17 That the ob-
ject of unemployment insurance is within the reserved power of the
state is unquestionable.' 8 The difficult barrier is whether the statute
is a reasonable approach toward that end and it is with great interest
.that the final outcome is awaited in the Supreme Court of the United
States.
M. McC.
CONTRACT-CONSTRUCTION-INDEFINITE AS TO TIME.-The
plaintiff corporation was granted exclusive right to service all ac-
counts acquired by defendant, a corporation engaged in the business
of soliciting customers who required the extermination of vermin.
"°Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U. S. 312, 42 Sup. Ct. 124 (1921); Pennsylvania
Coal Co. v. Mahon, 210 U. S. 393, 416, 43 Sup. Ct. 158 (1922).
'Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 210 U. S. 393, 416, 43 Sup. Ct. 158
(1922).
'Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U. S. 525, 43 Sup. Ct. 393 (1923);
Railroad Retirement Board et al. v. The Alton Railroad Co. et aL, 295 U. S.
330, 55 Sup. Ct. 765 (1935).
"Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U. S. 104, 31 Sup. Ct. 186 (1911).
"Hawkins v. Bleakly et al., 243 U. S. 210, 37 Sup. Ct. 255 (1916) ; New
York Central Railroad Co. v. White, 243 U. S. 188, 37 Sup. Ct. 247 (1916);
Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U. S. 219, 37 Sup. Ct. 260 (1916).
"Head Money Cases, 112 U. S. 580, 5 Sup. Ct. 247 (1884); Cooley v.
Board of Wardens, 12 How. 299 (U. S. 1851) ; Noble State Bank v. Haskell,
219 U. S. 104, 31 Sup. Ct. 225 (1916) ; Hawkins v. Bleakly et at., 243 U. S.
210, 37 Sup. Ct. 255 (1916); New York Central Railroad Co. v. White, 343
U. S. 188, 37 Sup. Ct. 247 (1916) ; Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243
U. S. 219, 37 Sup. Ct. 260 (1916); Dayton-Goose Greek Co. v. U. S., 263
U. S. 456, 44 Sup. Ct. 169 (1924); R. R. Retirement Board et al. v. Alton R.
Co. et al., 295 U. S. 495. 55 Sup. Ct. 837 (1935) ; U. S. v. Butler. 3 U. S. Law
Week 373, 56 Sup. Ct. 312 (1936) ; State v. Cassidy, 32 Minn. 312 (1875).
"Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U. S. 104, 31 Sup. Ct. 186 (1911).
'House v. Mayes, 219 U. S. 270, 282. 31 Sup. Ct. 234 (1911).
" Brown, Due Process of Law, Police Power and the Suprene Court (1927)
40 HARv. L. Ray. 943; Legis. (1935) 10 ST. Jon,'s L. Ray. 147, 155; 3 LAW
AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS (1936) 138.
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Defendant was to pay a stated compensation for the services ren-
dered during the term of the agreement; said term was to continue
in effect from the day of entry into the contract "until and unless
abrogated, cancelled and annulled by the consent of both parties
thereto." Defendant terminated the contract without plaintiff's con-
sent, claiming that since all contracts were subject to cancellation by
mutual consent the clause providing for such cancellation was sur-
plusage, and that the agreement was therefore indefinite as to dura-
tion and the contract was one terminable at the will of either party.
On appeal from an order of the Supreme Court in favor of defen-
dant, held, reversed. The duration of the contract was measured, in
the absence of mutual cancellation, by the existence of either corpo-
ration; the contract is, therefore, definite and enforceable. United
Chemical and Exterminating Co., Inc. v. Security Exterminating
Corp., 246 App. Div. 258, 285 N. Y. Supp. 291 (1st Dept. 1936).
The law does not favor, but rather avoids, the destruction of
contracts because of uncertainty.1 While it is an implied condition
to every contract that it is terminable by mutual consent,2 the parties
in the instant case took pains to clearly express in writing their in-
tention that the contract be terminable upon the happening of a par-
ticular event-abrogation by mutual consent and had they meant
one terminable at will they would have said so. The provision as
to cancellation takes on added significance from the fact that no other
limit was imposed by the terms of the contract other than that spring-
ing from its inherent nature. The court will try to give effect to
the intent of the parties as shown by the fair import of the language
employed; 3 to give full effect to the intention expressed in the in-
stant case the court must declare the contract to be permanent and
revocable only by that meeting of the minds which is essential to the
rescission of a contract by mutual consent.4
Although the contract failed to state the term in days, weeks, or
years for which it should continue in force, it expressed an inten-
tion to enter into an agreement which should continue until the oc-
currence of a particular event, namely, abrogation by mutual con-
sent. Contracts so expressed as to be discharged by the occurrence
of a particular event have been upheld and enforced in New York 5
1 WHITNE.Y, CONTRACTS (2d 1934) § 24; Saunders v. Barnaby, 166 App.
Div. 274, 151 N. Y. Supp. 580 (1st Dept. 1915) (a contract should be con-
strued so as to support rather than defeat it).
-°Ashley v. Cathcart, 159 Ala. 474, 49 So. 75 (1909).3White v. Hoyt, 73 N. Y. 505 (1878) ; Durland v. Pitcairn, 51 Ind. 426.
'Conservative Ins. Co. v. Hutchinson, 52 S. W. (2d) 709 (1932).
Potter v. City of N. Y., 59 App. Div. 70, 68 N. Y. Supp. 1039 (2d Dept.
1901); Crotty v. Erie R. Co., 149 App. Div. 262, 133 N. Y. Supp. 696 (2d
Dept. 1912); Schwarz v. Regensburgh, 227 N. Y. 568, 124 N. E. 901 (1919);
Rague v. Eve. Journal, 146 App. Div. 126, 149 N. Y. Supp. 668 (2d Dept.
1914) (plaintiff held entitled to receive payments from defendant as long as
he refrained from the sale of a certain paper) ; 2 CLARK, N.av YORK LAW OF
CoNTRcs § 875.
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and other jurisdictions. 6
Defendant entered into the agreement because of the need for
the services of an exterminator which his business required. This
need for plaintiff's services would remain as long as defendant re-
mained in business and solicited accounts. The contract must endure
so long as the object contemplated by it remained unfilled or until it
had been terminated by mutual consene
Since the defendant only agreed that plaintiff shall perform all
the work of a particular character which defendant might solicit,
the defendant would not be liable to plaintiff if it discontinued busi-
ness, 8 received an extension of charter,9 or was dissolved as a cor-
poration; 10 thus the contract is definite, for by its inherent nature
it could not continue beyond the corporate existence of the defendant;
contracts whose duration is measured by the parties' existence in
business have been upheld as definite." Corporate parties, for their
joint protection, may make and enforce contracts with one another
which are intended to continue throughout the corporate life of either
unless rescinded by mutual consent.12
It is the settled law that in New York a contract providing for
a continuing performance of indefinite duration may be terminated
at will by either party to such contract upon giving reasonable no-
tice; 13 in the same manner, a contract for persorjal services unlim-
ited as to time may be terminated.' 4  While the validity of the latter
6Cohen v. Cohen, 141 Cal. 534, 75 Pac. 100 (1904) (a provision for
monthly payments to two sisters "as long as they remain unmarried" found
definite, and enforceable until they married); James Maccalum Printing Co.
v. Graphite Co., 150 Mo. App. 383, 130 S. W. 836 (1910) (contract provided
that plaintiff was to get defendant's printing work on "succeeding issues" if
his price were no more than another printer's. Defendant refused to give
plaintiff the work although his price was as low as other reputable printers.
Held, plaintiff must be given the work as long as his bids were no higher
than other printers. The contract expressed an intention of the parties to
confer a perpetuity of right or obligation and is valid).
'Western Union Tel. Co. v. Penn. Co., 129 Fed. 849 (C. C. A. 3d 1904).
s Fox v. Comm. Press Co., 28 Ky. 44, 88 S. W. 1063 (1905).
' Pullman Car Co. v. Cent. Trans. Co., 171 U. S. 139, 18 Sup. Ct. 808
(1898).
o Petro. Corp. v. Better Gas. Co.. 157 Misc. 1, 282 N. Y. Supp. 671 (1936).
'Ehrenworth v. Stuhmer and Co., 229 N. Y. 210, 128 N. E. 108 (1920)
(defendant agreed to exclusively furnish plaintiff with all the black bread
plaintiff required on his route. The contract was to last as long as the parties
continued in business. Defendant breached the contract by selling to others on
plaintiff's route. Plaintiff sues for damages for breach. Held, the contract
could endure only as long as the parties were in business and is therefore
definite in duration) ; Jugea v. Trouttett, 120 N. Y. 21, 23 N. E. 1066 (1890).
' Llanelly Ry. etc. Co. v. London etc. Co. L. R., 7 H. L. 550; Franklin
Tel. Co. v. Harrison, 145 U. S. 459, 12 Sup. Ct. 884 (1892).
" Baily v. Stafford Inc., 178 App. Div. 811, 166 N. Y. Supp. 79 (1st
Dept. 1912); Outerbridge v. Campbell, 87 App. Div. 597, 84 N. Y. Supp. 537(2d Dept. 1903); 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (1924) § 38; see 2 CLARK, NEW
YoRK LAW OF CONTRACTS (1922) 1318.
"
4Watson v. Guginr, 204 N. Y. 535, 98 N. E. 18 (1912) ; Martain v. N. Y.
Life Ins. Co., 148 N. Y. 117, 42 N. E. 416 (1895).
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rule is unchallenged,", the former is opposed by the weight of opin-
ion in other states, 6 the English rule,17 and the Federal rule, upheld
by the United States Supreme Court,"" to the effect that contracts
(continuing, and indefinite as to duration) with the exception of
those for personal services' 9 cannot be regarded as terminable ex-
cept by mutual consent.
B. B.
CORPORATIONS - EQUAL PROTECTION OF LAws - STATUTORY
SUSPENSION OF FELLOW SERVANT RULE.-Plaintiff, injured by a
fellow employee of defendant company, a foreign corporation organ-
ized in Delaware and authorized to do business in Arkansas, is suing
in Arkansas to recover damages for injuries suffered by him.' The
Arkansas statutes provide that all corporations shall be liable for in-
juries sustained by an employee resulting from negligence of any
other employee.2 They also provide that foreign corporations au-
thorized to do business in the state shall be subject to the same regu-
lations and liabilities as domestic corporations.3 Defendant petroleum
company claims that these statutes violate the equal protection
clause 4 because it makes corporations, domestic and foreign, liable
for personal injuries sustained by an employee through negligence
of any other employee while as to non-corporate employers the
common-law rule that every servant assumes the risk of injuries
through the negligence of his fellow servants still obtains. Held,
plaintiff was entitled to recover as the defendant corporation became
'McKell v. Chesapeake, 175 Fed. 321 (C. C. A. 6th 1910) ; 13 C. J. 630.
"Pitts. etc. Co. v. Reno, 123 Ill. 273, 14 N. E. 195 (1887); Globe Ins. Co.
v. Wayne, 75 Ohio St. 451, 80 N. E. 13 (1907); Rossmassler v. Spielberger,
270 Pa. St. 30, 112 Atl. 872 (1921) (where no limitation as to time is ex-
pressed in the agreement, neither party can terminate it without the consent of
the other) ; 6 R. C. L. 282; id. 895.
" Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Manchester etc. Co., 5 D. G. & S. 138;
Llanelly etc. Ry. v. London etc. Co., L. R. 7 H. L. 550.
"Franklin Tel. Co. v. Harrison, 145 U. S. 459, 12 Sup. Ct. 884 (1892);
Miss. Logging Co. v. Robinson, 69 Fed. 773 (C. C. A. 8th, 1895); Western
Union Tel. Co. v. Penn. Co., 129 Fed. 849, 68 L. R. A. 968 (C. C. A. 3d, 1904).
"°Warden v. Hinds, 163 Fed. 201 (C. C. A. 4th, 1908).
'297 U. S. 629, 56 Sup. Ct. 611 (1936).
2 ARx. DIG. STAT. (Crawford & Moses, 1907) § 7137.
ARK. CoNsr. Art. 12, § 11.
'U. S. CoNsT., Amend. 14, cl. 2: "No State shall make or enforce any
law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of the law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws." Corporations are persons within the mean-
ing of this amendment. Covington, etc. Rood Co. v. Landford, 164 U. S.
578, 592, 17 Sup. Ct. 198 (1896).
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